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Abstract: 
Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘Soft Power’ has become an increasingly used term to help explain 
why states – including so-called ‘emerging states’ – are paying greater attention towards 
acquiring various forms of cultural and political attraction. However, within mainstream 
International Relations, Political Science, and Sport Studies literature, a continuous debate 
remains as to what actually constitutes soft power, how national leaders go about acquiring it, 
and how forms of attraction convert into power outcomes in both the short- and long-term. 
This paper endeavours to overcome these issues by offering an ‘Ideal-Type’ model which 
details states’ soft power strategies, the mechanisms they use, and the tangible future 
outcomes they gain. The paper is separated into five sections. First the concept of soft power 
is introduced and its contribution, application and limitations are critically evaluated. Second, 
crucial background information on the various national authorities engaged with to arrive at 
the ideal type is offered, along with a discussion of the research methods used. Third, the 
paper advances an ideal-type model of a state’s soft power strategy, explicitly detailing, in 
the process, the considerations and rationale behind the design. Fourth, empirical data 
gathered by the authors around Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Qatar’s 
acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup is used as ‘test cases’ to show the utility of the 
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ideal-type. The paper concludes by reflecting on the contribution this model makes to current 
literature and how it could be used in future research.    
Keywords: sports mega-events; football World Cup; soft power; sport diplomacy; 
Germany; Qatar. 
 
Main Article 
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft 
power’1 by scholars and commentators attempting to explain why states – including so-called 
‘emerging states’ – are seeking to acquire various forms of cultural and political attraction. 
However, within mainstream scholarship in international relations, political science, and 
sport studies literature, a continuous debate remains as to what actually constitutes soft 
power, how national leaders go about acquiring it, and how forms of attraction convert into 
power outcomes in both the short- and long-term. The intention of this article is to move 
beyond a discussion of Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ towards an ‘ideal type’ of a 
state’s soft power strategy that can be used in future empirical research – sporting, diplomatic 
and otherwise. One of the problems with Nye’s work – and much of the academic discourse it 
has inspired – is that debates remain lofty, concepts slippery and theories opaque, rendering 
their use in actual research difficult. In previous work the authors have critiqued the term but 
came to the conclusion that ‘Joseph Nye clearly put his finger on something when coining the 
concept of “soft power”— there has evidently been a shift in attempts to manipulate the 
“politics of attraction” in international affairs among states of all political hues’.2 The 
originality of the current article lies in its attempt to build out from the authors’ empirical 
studies of sport diplomacy to construct an heuristic device, an ‘ideal type’ that can be used by 
researchers to analyse further case studies to understand the components of states’ soft power 
strategies.  
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As part of the strategic shift from employing ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ power, states have increasingly 
used sport in general and sports mega-events (SMEs) in particular. The latter are often used 
as broad-brush diplomatic tools to increase a state’s international prestige, improve an often 
tarnished image and increase the likelihood of the bidding state’s acceptance on the world 
stage, drawing on two sports-related examples to exemplify the utility of the ideal type. 
SMEs are seen by the majority of regime types as part of their wider diplomatic armoury and 
by their very nature these events cut across all of the areas identified by the authors which are 
considered important for generating soft power. This is significant, as current debates tend to 
focus on semantics or fail to engage with the concept, rather than providing a conceptual 
framework with which to attempt to understand a state’s soft power strategy. As such the 
authors refrain from confronting many of Nye’s conceptual limitations while providing the 
rationale for their research methods and sources used in developing the analysis. In 
introducing an ideal type, flesh is added to the theoretical bones of much of this debate by 
highlighting the mechanisms national governments and relevant stakeholders draw on to 
acquire soft power. To illustrate its potential two real-life test-cases are provided: Germany’s 
hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Qatar’s sport diplomacy, including the acquisition 
of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.3 The possible pitfalls of any soft power strategy are also 
highlighted before concluding how this ideal type might be used in future research to help 
further identify and explain the mechanisms through which a state can acquire soft power for 
diplomatic purposes.  
 
‘Soft Power’: concept, debate and limitations  
The concept of ‘soft power’ was coined in 1990 by the American political scientist, 
Joseph Nye. For Nye, the ‘power’ side of the concept denotes one’s ability to ‘effect the 
outcomes you want, and, if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this 
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happen’.4 For twenty-first century leaders, Nye suggests political outcomes can be achieved 
through an amalgamation of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power strategies.5 On the one hand, states 
may draw upon forms of ‘hard power’, through, for example, capitalizing on military force or 
offering economic rewards; on the other, they may choose to indirectly adapt the political 
agenda in such a way which shapes the preferences of others through, for instance, emulating 
one’s ‘intangible assets’: attractive culture, innovative ideologies, and/or credible and 
commendable institutions, values and policies.6 It is this latter approach which Nye calls ‘soft 
power’: ‘the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion’.7 Such attraction 
converts into power outcomes when those on the receiving end of the soft power strategy 
look to the state producing it for affirmation, guidance and leadership, or seek to imitate their 
domestic and/or international achievements.8 
This is, however, not to suggest that soft power should replace the utilization of hard 
power – in-fact national leaders should, whenever possible, endeavour to combine the soft 
dimension of attraction with the hard dimensions of coercion and inducement (what Nye 
terms ‘smart power’).9 Rather, Nye advocates that nation-states should take greater advantage 
of the former.10 Nye’s rationale for this is three fold. First, since the end of the Cold War 
nation-states have become far more concerned with forms of welfare over military glory, 
whereby in the modern era national leaders need greater public support before engaging in 
forceful pursuits.11 Second, for the majority of states, the use of force severely jeopardizes 
their economic objectives and ability to maintain international competitiveness.12 Finally, the 
increasing influence of the information revolution and globalization has led to states’ 
behaviour coming under closer scrutiny than ever before. The result is that the use of force 
has become less tolerated in post-industrial (and, in particular, advanced capitalist) societies, 
leading to the increasing importance of soft forms of power.13 
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The significance of the concept is demonstrated most evidently through the increasing 
number of academics, politicians and governmental authorities, private institutions and 
agencies, and journalists and blog writers that have attempted to apply, adapt and/or measure 
soft power in their discussions of state-led policies. A good example from the latter group is 
Susie Mesure of The Independent who classifies the global obsession with K-pop music as a 
significant cog in South Korean’s soft power offensive, one which has seen the state 
successfully overtake rivals Japan as Asia’s ‘coolest child’;14 Takashi Umekawa from 
Reuters identifies the Japan Foreign Ministry’s plan to inject $15 million into the funding of 
Japanese studies and research at overseas universities as a clear push for enhanced ‘soft 
power’, one which is greatly helping internationally promote ‘Japan Brand’;15 and, finally, 
Roula Khalaf of the Financial Times grounds the United Kingdom’s decision to commit a 
new fund towards the protection of historic property after Isis’s ‘cultural war’ and subsequent 
destruction of ancient sites in Syria as a significant soft power coup, a decision which has 
been praised by numerous Syrians who are determined to safeguard their ‘identity and 
existence’.16 
A second group consists of politicians and governmental authorities who have 
referred to soft power in speeches and various state policies. Prominent examples include 
Hillary Clinton’s reference to both soft power and smart power at the 2013 Council for 
Foreign Relations in Washington, DC;17 the UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s description 
of Britain’s place in the world as a ‘soft power super power’ in a speech on the importance of 
Scotland to the UK at the Olympic Park in East London in 2014;18 and, finally, the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping’s Communist Party address in Beijing in 2014 where he singled out the 
importance of raising China’s soft power reach as well as the need to better communicate the 
country’s message to the world.19 With regard to governments and soft power, a good 
example is the workshop dedicated to the use of smart power at the U.S. Department of 
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State’s Third Annual Conference on Program Evaluation in 201020 the British Parliament’s 
2013 establishment of its ‘Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence’, which led to 
the publication of two extensive volumes in March 201421; The British Academy’s 2014 ‘the 
Art of Attraction, Soft Power and the UK’s role in the world’, which looks to pinpoint and 
document the UK’s most fundamental soft power resources; and the centrality of soft power 
in the Australian Government’s ‘Public Diplomacy Strategy 2014-16’, which lays out the 
state’s plans to significantly increase ‘trade, investment and economic prosperity 
promotion’.22  
The third group identified by the authors consists of a number of private institutions 
and agencies who are concerned with measuring a state’s soft power reach. These include the 
UK based Monocle Media Group, who, in collaboration with the UK Institute for 
Government, publish their annual ‘Soft Power Survey’, ranking the top thirty countries 
worldwide based on their culture, cuisine, sport, governance and diplomacy;23 Portland 
Communication’s yearly ‘the Soft Power 30’, which attempts to measure the soft power 
properties and subsequent public opinion of states, positioning the top thirty countries based 
on their diplomatic networks, cultural impact, governmental ideologies, level of education, 
digital infrastructure, and economic capacity;24 Ernst and Young Global Limited’s year on 
year ‘Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index’, which looks to measure the leading twenty 
countries based on their global integrity, global integration and global image;25 and finally, 
although not referring directly to soft power, is Anholt-GfK’s ‘Nation Brand Index’, which 
grades the top fifty nations on public opinion acquired from 20,000 citizens in twenty 
countries on how they perceive a state’s people, products, culture, government, education, 
lifestyle and tourism.26 
The fourth and most dominant group consists of academics who have applied Nye’s 
concept in their attempt to theorize various state-led pursuits. In commenting on the field of 
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international relations, for example, Melissen advocates ‘it is now a cliché to state that soft 
power is increasingly important in the global information age’;27 such an observation finds 
genuine support by those scholars who have argued that China is currently engaged in a soft 
power offensive through the promotion of its Confucius Institutes abroad, its involvement in 
United Nations peacekeeping missions and various humanitarian efforts, as well as the rise 
and international reach of its media outlets, Central China Television (CCTV) and Xinhua 
News Agency;28 furthermore, many have claimed that India’s rising international reputation 
for excellence in film, business and technology equates to a drive for soft power;29 likewise, 
Brazil is said to be engaged in a soft power strategy through its leading role in successfully 
negotiating multiple international agreements related to public health, as well as its position 
as the world’s largest aid donors;30 and it has been argued that Turkey exerts significant soft 
power across the Arab world due its recent democratization efforts across the region, its 
economic success, rising credibility and shared heritage.31 Finally, Russia is said to have 
‘failed to capitalize on the soft-power boost afforded to Russia by hosting the 2014 Winter 
Olympic Games in Sochi’, according to Joseph Nye,32 although this is, as Golubchikov33 
states, a ‘reductionist’ account of the use of this SME as a signal of Russia’s growing power.  
As with most mainstream concepts, the time-lag is fairly long before soft power 
begins to appear in sports studies literature and analyses. ‘Social capital’ took some six years 
from Putnam’s successful 2000 book, Bowling Alone, to enter sport studies;34 ‘soft power’ 
has taken even longer. Within the sports studies literature it took some 20 years for the 
concept to gain traction. The growing scholarship has focused towards identifying sport’s 
diplomatic and/or soft power functions for national leaders and nation-states more 
generally;35 Murray, for example, looks at the pros and cons of using sport for diplomatic 
goals36; and Jackson pinpoints how the use of sport, although regularly used as a diplomatic 
tool, has in fact historically fostered many instances of conflict37; furthermore, use of the 
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concept has been most prevalent by those scholars who attempt to explain the global lure of 
hosting both first-order (FIFA World Cup; Olympic Games) and second-order (Rugby World 
Cup; Commonwealth Games) SMEs: the most notable work here can be found through the 
examples of Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup;38 Beijing’s staging of the 2008 
Olympic Games;39 the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa;40 the 2011 Rugby World Cup 
in New Zealand;41 the London 2012 Olympics;42 Brazil’s ‘double hosting’ of the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games;43 Sochi’s delivery of the 2014 Winter Olympic 
Games;44 and Qatar’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.45 In most cases, hosting a 
successful SME is thought to lead to enhanced soft power that can make a state’s culture and 
political values more attractive to others, thus improving the image or ‘brand’ of the host 
and/or signalling their emerging status as a key international actor.46 In short, sport is no 
longer just a niche cultural institution for national governments to consider employing 
domestically, but rather a highly relevant foreign policy tool.47 
One could be forgiven for presuming that with the quantity of commentators making 
use of Nye’s concept – across the four groups outlined – an excellent heuristic device with 
which to help explain how and why states engage in the ‘politics of attraction’ on the 
international stage would have been developed. Unfortunately, although the concept has shed 
some light on why states undertake a soft power strategy (for international prestige/increased 
trade etc.), little has been discussed on the ‘how’. Indeed, despite its growing significance, 
many have strongly criticized Nye’s work.48 Through these authors’ attempts to unpick, 
understand and extend soft power theoretically, Nye’s original concept has been, and, more 
importantly, continues to be, questioned on four specific levels: first, many have raised 
concerns over what soft power actually is, and, more specifically, whether it is merely 
another buzzword for conceptualizing that of nation branding and/or place marketing;49 
second, many have suggested that Nye fails to deliver a clear description of how one actually 
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acquires ‘soft power’ or forms of attraction, leading to the concept becoming highly 
confusing and problematic to work with;50 third, due to Nye’s reliance on discussions of the 
West, many equate soft power as being either too structural or Western-centric;51 and finally, 
some have argued that greater academic attention is needed in identifying and highlighting 
the potential pitfalls for any state that attempts to acquire soft power forms.52 
In responding to the first criticism above, Nye himself - along with others - has been 
quick to remind us that soft power should not merely be considered another term for place 
marketing/nation branding.53 As Nye has been at pains to advocate, soft power is not simply 
the ability to persuade; it is the ability to entice and attract, leading to acquiescence and 
imitation. Considering this, if a state’s culture, values and/or policies are not themselves 
authentically attractive, no soft power outcomes will be gained;54 soft power cannot be 
achieved through slick marketing and/or branding, but emanates from, above all else, 
credibility – a value which simple propaganda and/or public relations campaigns often lack.55 
In agreement with Nye, we would argue that although selling a positive image of oneself is a 
significant part of public diplomacy, for soft power to work, leaders need to, first-and-
foremost, build long-term relationships based on trust and credibility, eventually leading to an 
enabling environment for effective government policies. Given this, the authors agree with 
Nye that soft power aligns itself more to public diplomacy than nation building and/or place 
marketing;56 indeed, successful soft power requires regular and equal communication with 
foreign audiences, ‘listening as well as [simply] talking’.57 
Unfortunately, however, Nye fails to offer much in the way of a solution to the 
remaining three criticisms levelled towards him. This contribution to the literature seeks to 
redress this in part by: setting out tangible areas in which states acquire soft power; offering 
empirical examples of real-life cases to show what soft power acquisition looks like in 
practice; using a non-Western case study to illustrate that soft power transcends geographical 
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localities. In the following sections, therefore, the focus is on presenting an ‘ideal type’ that 
goes some way to identifying how states actually go about acquiring soft power forms, the 
mechanisms involved, and how these convert into long-term outcomes. This is achieved by 
drawing on the empirical examples of one Western state (Germany and its hosting of the 
2006 FIFA World Cup) and one non-Western state (Qatar’s sport diplomacy) in order to 
identify the universal applicability of soft power. 
 
Methods 
The ideal-type put-forward is derived from empirical work conducted over a four year 
period by the authors with national authorities in Europe, South America and the Middle 
East.58 In addition, the authors have generated knowledge as part of a multi-state research 
project on the leveraging strategies adopted by countries hosting mega-events in an attempt to 
produce tangible ‘legacies’, including, amongst others, showcasing their nation, improving 
their national image and putting themselves on the international map.59 The following is 
indicative of the range of sources drawn upon which fed into the development of the idea 
type. Both studies of Germany and Qatar have been published in full elsewhere (see endnote 
3).   
After ethical approval (Universities of Birmingham and Loughborough), the data 
collection strategy occurred in two stages. The first included the continued collection and 
analysis of documents between 2011 and 2015 in connection to the foreign policy and soft 
power objectives of German and Qatari authorities. In selecting documents, only those 
published directly by state authorities or state-subsidiaries (e.g. national tourist boards, 
national governing bodies/sporting committees, etc.) were included in the final sample. Thus, 
in order to ensure the content of each document resembled the objectives of the state, any and 
all documents not directly derived from German and Qatari authorities were excluded. In 
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adhering to this inclusion-exclusion criterion, the final document sample resembled that 
depicted in Table 1. The document analysis guided the construction of interview schedules 
and interviews with state officials.60 
Country Included Document Sources  
Germany 
- German Federal Government Reports; 
- German Federal Ministry of Interior 
Reports; 
- German Tourist Board; 
- Germany ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign; 
- 2006 World Cup Organising 
Committee. 
Qatar 
- Qatar General Secretariat for 
Development Planning; 
- 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery 
and Legacy; 
- Aspire Academy for Sports Excellence; 
- Qatar Supreme Council for Health; 
- International Centre for Sports 
Security; 
Table 1: Document Inclusion-Exclusion Criterion 
The second stage of our data collection strategy included semi-structured interviews 
with key officials in Germany and the State of Qatar between 2011 and 2015. The ability of 
semi-structured interviews to produce the most in-depth accounts of specific phenomena, as 
well as combine the flexibility of unstructured techniques with more focused, structured-like 
forms, led to the decision to use this form of interviewing.61 Key organizations and personnel 
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were chosen in line with the study’s aims and objectives (see Table 2)62 and all participants 
were required to be over the age of 18 years old.  
Participant must work for state-run/funded organization; 
Participant must work in relevant department (foreign policy, 
tourism, sports policy/development, public relations, etc.) within 
state organization; 
Participant must hold a certain level of expertise within organization 
(Director, Manager, Senior Official, Committee Member, 
officer/analyst, etc.); 
Participant must be over 18 years of age. 
Table 2: Interview Inclusion Criterion 
As shown in Table 3, the final interview sample included: the German Foreign Office; 
the ‘Germany: Land of Ideas’ campaign, the state’s core place-branding initiative set-up by to 
showcase Germany’s culture, politics and business; the German Football Federation and the 
FIFA 2006 Organising Committee, the organizations responsible for successfully delivering 
and maintaining the legacy of the 2006 FIFA World Cup; the Qatar 2022 Supreme 
Committee for Delivery and Legacy, the organization responsible for the organization, 
delivery and maintenance of Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup legacy; the International Centre 
for Sports Security, the organization responsible for showcasing Qatar’s international 
commitment to integrity, security and safety through sport; the Aspire Academy of Sports 
Excellence, the organization responsible for training and development of aspiring athletes; 
the Qatar National Health Strategy, the organization responsible for achieving Qatar’s desire 
to occupy a world-leading healthcare system; and, Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Program, 
the centre responsible for the promotion of international collaborative education and research.  
Country Interviewee(s)  
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Germany 
- Two Foreign Policy & 
Communications officers from the 
German Foreign Office; 
- The Chief Executive of ‘Germany: 
Land of Ideas’; 
- The Secretary General of the German 
Football Federation and the Vice 
President of the FIFA 2006 Organising 
Committee. 
Qatar 
- Supreme Committee member and one 
Public Relations and Communications 
Director from the Qatar 2022 Supreme 
Committee for Delivery and Legacy; 
- Public Relations Manager of the 
International Centre for Sports 
Security; 
- Public Relations Director and the Head 
of Sport Development at the Aspire 
Academy of Sports Excellence; 
- The Director of the Qatar National 
Health Strategy; 
- The Director of Research of Qatar 
University’s Gulf Studies Program. 
Table 3: Interviewee positions and organizations 
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Data was subjected to a thorough thematic analysis through first, reading and re-
reading of documents and transcribed interviews; second, generating ‘initial codes’ which 
identified parts of the data found most significant; third, identifying the various relationships 
that existed between these initial codes, which allowed the authors to begin the process of 
creating overarching themes; fourth, the themes were then re-worked until each theme was 
distinctive in its own right. Following this stage the authors then re-consulted the literature 
and concluded the analysis by assigning a name to our themes which captured the overall 
‘story’ each was telling.63 
A central part of the contribution is the development of an ideal type of soft power 
that will be of use to both academics and practitioners alike. An ideal type is, of course, a 
construct that represents an intellectual description of a phenomenon in its abstract form and 
does not provide us with explanations. What follows should not be understood as an ‘ideal’ 
standard ‘in the sense of being perfect, but rather that it is “ideal” in the sense of being an 
intellectual construct that may never exist in the real world’.64 Rather, an ideal type is a 
conceptualisation with which the researcher can compare reality on the ground (empirical 
evidence). Ideal types are thus hypothetical constructs formed by emphasising aspects of 
behaviour and institutions which are (generally) empirically observable. These constructs 
isolate ‘those variables central to the study of a problem, putting aside those aspects of the 
reality which seem inessential to the analysis’.65 This ideal type has been developed through 
an iterative process between concepts and empirical data across a number of cases, as stated 
above, including non-Western states (Brazil, Qatar, Russia) and Western states (UK, 
Germany, Canada). Two key points ought to be noted at this juncture: first, the purpose of an 
ideal type is to be parsimonious. By definition this will mean that there will be a number of 
aspects that are not included in our model; second, our purpose is not to advance a ‘theory’ of 
soft power or an explanatory framework for predicting outcomes, but rather to produce a tool 
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that can be used and adapted by researchers looking at a variety of states and their soft power 
strategies. 
 
Towards an ‘Ideal Type’ of a States’ Soft Power Package  
The ideal type of soft power and the domains within which they are likely to be found 
are revealed from the two ‘test cases’66 – one actual SME (FIFA 2006 World Cup) and one 
longer-term sports diplomatic strategy (by Qatar) – drawn from sport for two, simple reasons. 
First, sport is an under-researched yet fruitful area for soft power/diplomacy research; both 
political science and international relations as disciplines are bereft of in-depth studies using 
sport/sporting events as part of a nation’s soft power strategy.67 Some slow progress has been 
made since Taylor suggested in 1986 that IR and sport suffer from a case of ‘mutual 
neglect’.68 Sports studies literature more broadly has begun to engage with the political and 
diplomatic use of sport. SMEs, in particular, are considered as significant soft power 
opportunities, acting as major contributions in the process of improving their nation’s image, 
profiling and showcasing themselves globally and ‘attracting’ others.69 International sporting 
success, whether by athletic competition or by the effective staging of SMEs, is said to 
provide the perfect opportunity for states who seek to ‘attract’ others with their values and 
culture and persuade them to want what they want by projecting specific images, principles, 
achievements and visions to foreign publics.70 
The second key reason why sporting test cases were chosen is that sport and sports 
events play a role in all five of the (interlinked) ‘resources’ that appear essential in a state’s 
successful soft power strategy (see figure). First, is the resource of ‘Culture’ – to which 
‘SMEs’ clearly belong. A state’s culture is often central to making a state more attractive to 
others, one of the reasons states such as Germany and China invest heavily in language 
institutes abroad; art, heritage, history and literature fall under this category too and are often 
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leveraged to improve a state’s global standing. The UK’s World Service acts as a cultural 
conduit exemplifying the global reach of English as a language and the British values of 
democracy and fair news reporting.71 
 
Figure 1: Soft Power ‘Resources’ 
The second resource, ‘Tourism’, is closely linked with both ‘Branding’ and 
‘Diplomacy’ (the third and fourth resources respectively) and serves the purpose of attracting 
foreigners to a state, bringing with them business for the tourist industry; equally, satisfied 
tourists can act as multipliers passing on positive messages about the host country on their 
return, something reported to have happened in Germany’s case through hosting the 2006 
FWC.72 ‘Branding’, the third resource, takes aspects such as ‘tourism’ and ‘culture’ and 
attempts to package them to ‘sell’ a country externally. Van Ham suggests that such state 
branding is an attempt to gain prestige on the world stage.73 
Diplomacy is a broad resource that entails formal state-to-state relations, but also 
encompasses the multitude of actors now involved in diplomatic relations. Public diplomacy 
studies differentiate between the ‘old’ modus operandi via ‘hierarchical state-centric 
structures’ on the one hand and the ‘new’ model of a ‘network environment’ in which several 
actors, of which the state is but one, undertake public diplomacy.74 The role of non-state 
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actors in the burgeoning area of a ‘sports’ diplomacy - that is, both the use of sport to achieve 
diplomatic ends, but also the more prominent role of the International Olympic Committee 
and other international non-governmental organisations – is greatly increasing. Whereas a 
few well-known examples of sport being used as an ‘ice-breaker’ in diplomatic affairs are 
regularly cited (e.g. the ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy between the US and China), a wide range of 
regime types are now signing up to host a SME to signal their arrival on the world stage. 
Recent examples include the ‘BRICS’ states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), 
Qatar and Azerbaijan. 
Finally, the ‘Trade’ resource is straightforward: states use all of the resources 
discussed above to increase their global trade and grow their economies; this can entail 
finding new markets within which to sell products they manufacture or to sell their own 
‘goods’ such as financial services. SMEs are often used to send out a ‘signal’ that a state has 
the requisite infrastructure and logistical know-how to do business at the highest and most 
efficient level; the construction of sporting sites themselves often lead to extensive flows of 
human capital between states.  
Taken together, the five domains highlighted above constitute the areas within which 
states attempt to gain soft power. Clearly, some of the components of the ideal type above are 
relatively constant, for example, ‘art’, ‘language’, ‘national identity’ and ‘values and morals’. 
Other components can be stimulated by key events, such as an SME. The latter can kick-start 
tourism, impact diplomatic relations and affect trade relations. Any success in these areas 
then becomes part of the nation’s ‘branding’. Australia, for example, understands and brands 
itself as a ‘sporting nation’, despite the fact that they suffer high levels of obesity. The 
Australian Tourist Commission suggested that the Sydney Olympics in 2000 ‘accelerated 
development of brand Australia by 10 years’.75 Of interest to the discussion here is that 
‘sport’ (including SMEs) cross-cuts all of the domains outlined. ‘Sport’ is part of a nation’s 
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cultural make-up. The majority of mainstream sports today began in England in the late 19th 
century; sports were spread across the world (in great part through the British Empire) and 
now stand as a cultural, universal language (i.e. association football [‘soccer’] shares the 
same rules throughout the world). SMEs are major tourist attractions – although net tourist 
gains are often off-set by ‘regular’ tourists remaining at home. Nonetheless, sports events 
often ‘force’ fans to visit places they would otherwise not; this can lead to repeat visits and 
the ‘multiplier’ effect – returning home and telling others of the good time spent in the host 
country. Nation’s and cities are often branded through sporting events (see Qatar below). 
Canada has become ‘addicted’ to hosting SMEs,76 for example, in an attempt to showcase 
itself globally. Finally, SMEs are often used as an arena to show diplomatic solidarity (but 
also disunity) between states.  
 
Germany’s Soft Power Strategy: the 2006 FIFA World Cup  
Germany’s hosting of the 2006 World Cup offers an excellent example of how a state 
can actively seek to make themselves both more attractive and more influential on the world 
stage. The following is necessarily brief and focuses on just some short examples from the 
‘resources’ highlighted in the ideal type above. A desk officer at the German Foreign Office 
set out their position in relation to cultural foreign policy: ‘We spend almost a quarter of the 
whole budget for foreign policy on culture which is more than 700 million Euros....this is the 
long-term promotion of ‘soft power’....we want to bring people together....and sport is one 
part of this [promotion of Germany’s culture]’.77 
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 Figure 2: Germany’s Soft Power ‘Package’ (2006) 
Germany wasted no time in implementing its ‘World Cup Hosting Strategy’78 with 
the express purpose of improving its poor image abroad. Overcoming negative stereotypes, it 
was believed, would lead to an increase in in-coming tourism and position Germany as an 
economic and scientific country to trade with.79 The German government also wanted 
Germany to be seen as a nation of culture (‘Kulturnation’) and its people to be known for 
more than just being ‘punctual, reliable and disciplined’.80 
The German strategy resulted in a long-term, carefully planned, coordinated and 
implemented set of actions designed to change the national ‘image’ of Germany among 
foreign publics. The ‘strategies’ in figure 2 take place in the resources identified in the soft 
power ideal type: the cultural augmentation strategy greatly increased the international scope 
of Germany’s World Cup through showing projects in 40 different countries and 87 different 
international cities.81 According to Green82 such ‘augmentation’ – that is, putting on 
activities, entertainment and services over and beyond the event itself – enhances and 
broadens the appeal of an event. In preparation to receive tourists, a number of campaigns 
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were specifically designed to prepare Germany and the Germans to be hospitable to the 
crowds of foreign visitors that were expected for the competition.83 One of the latter was the 
‘Nation-wide Service and Hospitality Campaign’ which published millions of brochures and 
held numerous workshops.84 The tourism industry seems to have benefitted from the four-
week tournament, allegedly earning ‘an extra 300 million Euros in revenue.’85 The 
‘Branding’ resource was headed up by the ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign,  launched in 2006 and 
designed to improve the German national image by showcasing Germany and attracting 
tourism and foreign investment. It was so successful that it continues to this day, bringing 
together key actors from business, science and culture, and facilitating the promotion of 
Germany’s image externally.86  
The diplomatic resource put into the 2006 World Cup extends to efforts to win the 
event in the first place (rumours of high-level bribery came to light in the most recent FIFA 
scandal), to securing the success of the event. The Foreign Office (FO) pursued an overall 
‘cultural diplomacy’ strategy, within which sport diplomacy took centre stage. The German 
FO worked closely with the Organising Committee and organized a whistle-stop ‘welcome 
tour’ for Franz Beckenbauer, the Committee’s Chair, to all 31 countries qualified for the 
tournament. According to the Vice Chair of the Committee, Horst R. Schmidt, ‘we received a 
high-level reception [in all 31 countries]; he went to the countries to welcome them to 
Germany....this greatly influenced the media coverage of the event positively...’87 
On trade, the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) in 
their report indicated that  
the most important economic stimulus was due to a greater willingness among 
Germans and foreign football fans to spend money. Almost 50% of all 
businesses who reported a positive effect from the FWC also reported 
increased sales in this context.88 
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Economically, the 2006 event appears to have paid off. The two million foreign tourists who 
travelled to Germany during the month-long tournament are estimated to have spent 600 
million euros.89 While it is notoriously difficult to find accurate data on the exact economic 
impact of the FWC on a nation’s economy, half of the companies who reported a positive 
‘FWC’ effect on their business thought the gain in reputation of Germany and its products 
was ‘the underlying reason for the economic success of this mega event’.90 This ‘reputational 
gain’, while hard to calculate, is clearly part of a successful soft power strategy.  
It is clear that the above ‘resources’ identified overlap: an augmentation plan 
involving arts, heritage and history is designed to attract tourists (‘Tourism’ resource) and to 
get them to stay longer and spend more money (‘Trade’). It also greatly adds to the 
‘Branding’ resource – Germany’s cultural history as the ‘land of poets and thinkers’ helps sell 
it as a tourist destination. Equally, part of the reason Germany’s soft power strategy worked 
well was because of wealth: hardly any resources were spent on ‘infrastructure’ (building 
roads, transport systems, stadia), as these were already present and at a very high standard. 
Thus, resources could be re-directed into the type of campaigns discussed here.  
 
Qatar’s Soft Power Ambitions through Sport Diplomacy  
Applying the ideal type to the case of Qatar reveals its soft power strategy via sport 
diplomacy. Due to its abundance of wealth, predominantly from the sale of crude oil and 
liquefied natural gas, Qatar is able to invest heavily in the acquisition of soft power through 
sports diplomacy. Qatar’s nominal GDP per capita is almost double that of Germany’s 
(US$93,965 compared to roughly US$47,589)91 and, relative to many states, a substantial 
proportion of this wealth has been invested in various sporting endeavours.92 Based on the 
authors’ various engagements with Qatari authorities and relevant documents, the argument is 
that Qatar’s soft power objectives through sport rest upon the mechanisms of culture, 
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tourism, branding, diplomacy and trade (see figure 3). It should be noted, however, that as 
Qatar’s engagements with global sport are fairly recent, the actual soft power outcomes have 
yet to fully materialize, and, therefore, the paper offers only the intended outcomes that 
Qatari authorities seek to achieve. 
 
Figure 3: Qatar’s Soft Power Sports Package 
One of the Qatari authority’s central objectives through sport is to debunk various 
negative cultural stereotypes, most particularly the ‘orientalist’ connotations of Arabs as 
static, undeveloped and lazy.93 In this sense, authorities see the hosting of SMEs that attract 
international audiences - such as the 2019 IAAF World Championships and the 2022 World 
Cup - as the most suitable vehicles through which to ‘create better understandings between 
the East and the West’.94 Most specifically here, Qatari authorities seek to ‘signal’ the ability 
of Arabs and Qataris to handle the logistical complexities of hosting major sports events. In 
addition, such events offer an ideal international showcase to their capacity for creating and 
implementing innovative and state-of-the-art technologies: the state’s achievements in 
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designing carbon-neutral, environmentally friendly cooling technology for the 2022 World 
Cup is a case in point.95 
Enhancing inward tourism is closely linked to debunking stereotypes, as in the 
German case study. At present, Qatar’s tourism trends are mostly comprised by those who 
travel to the state predominantly for various short-term conferences and business seminars.96 
According to Qatari authorities, one reason the state fails to attract longer-term holiday-
makers is due to the continuous inaccurate media portrayal of the Middle East as a 
homogenous region plagued by conflict and civil strife. Thus, hosting SMEs is one way in 
which to ‘educate international audiences of the differences between us [Qatar] and many of 
our regional [Middle Eastern] neighbours’97. The intention is also to show that the state is a 
safe and peaceful tourist destination. The hoped-for outcome here is the desire to attract 
longer-term holiday makers who will provide the state with a much needed revenue stream 
once its crude oil reserves diminish.98 
The ‘Branding’ resource sets out to raise awareness of Qatar - its location, history, 
culture and achievements. Two examples stand out here: the first is the Qatar Foundation’s 
original €170 million deal with FC Barcelona in 2010 to become the club’s shirt sponsor, the 
first ever commercial sponsorship of the FC Barcelona shirt; and second is the 2013 
agreement with FC Barcelona for Qatar Airways to replace the Qatar Foundation’s original 
agreement. Sponsorship of one of the globe’s largest sporting brands looks to raise 
international awareness of what Qatari has achieved in a short space of time: the Qatar 
Foundation’s ‘Education City’ plays host to the largest enclave of American universities 
outside the US, and has thus converted Doha into one of the leading educational hubs across 
the Middle East;99 and Qatar Airways has established itself as one of the fastest growing 
airlines in the world.100  
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The diplomatic resource includes the regular accommodating of sports conferences 
and athletic talent. The Doha Goals Forum, for example, annually invites hundreds of sports 
academics and athletes to Doha to discuss and debate the role of sport for economic and 
social progress; the Aspire Academy of Sport Excellence’s Football Dreams Initiative acts as 
an elite development programme, wherein ‘annually over 600,000 boys from across the 
world…undergo preliminary trials, with the best candidates being invited back to Doha for 
expert training’101; and the Academy’s sports medicine hospital, ‘ASPETAR’, welcomes a 
plethora of elite athletes each year to provide specialist expertise and treatment. In all such 
cases, the Qatari authorities look to transform the country, and the capital, Doha, into a key 
international centre for dialogue, research and training.102  
With regard to trade, Qatar has invested heavily abroad in a number of different areas, 
including multiple international sporting acquisitions. Most well-known is the Qatar Sports 
Investments’ acquisition of Paris Saint-Germain in 2012. In the same year, Qatar Sports 
Investments also purchased the French Ligue 1 television rights; broadcasting under the name 
‘beIN Sports’, the network now holds the rights to transmit live sport in ‘Hong Kong, the US, 
Canada, Australia and Indonesia’.103 Finally Qatari Diar purchased a large part of the London 
2012 Olympic Village, now known as ‘East Village’. Qatari Diar, the real-estate wing of the 
Qatar Investment Authority, purchased the land in 2011 and is, along with other major stake-
holders, Delancey, transforming the complex into luxury housing.104 Apart from the obvious 
long-term financial investment the state wishes to recoup, such projects also look to 
demonstrate Qatar’s acumen in the areas of business, finance and real-estate.  
Taken together, Qatar draws strongly on all five areas identified in the idea type with 
the express purpose of improving its standing on the international stage. As is well 
documented, the hosting of a sports event as part of this strategy can also backfire: by 
inviting the amount of media attention that a global sporting event attracts, a state is 
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challenging insatiable 24 hour media to scrutinize its modus operandi. In Germany’s case the 
global media witnessed a well-run, carnivalesque festival of sport enjoyed by a variety of 
cultures with very few problems; Qatar, however, has had an avalanche of poor media 
coverage around its dealings with foreign construction workers and the extraordinary 
employer-employee relations that exist. 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly further research is needed to develop the ideal type of soft power put forward 
in this paper. However, the attempt has been made to partially fill a major gap in the literature 
by offering a start to the debate on grounding soft power in empirical research. The latter was 
drawn from a test-case of Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Qatar’s sport 
diplomacy strategy. There has not been adequate space to develop the linkages between the 
‘resources’ highlighted in the ideal type: Culture, Tourism, Branding, Diplomacy and Trade. 
Yet, it is clear that these areas overlap and several institutions – for example, the Foreign 
Office in the UK – seek to promote all in the work that they, and their sponsored 
organisations do. The significance of the article lies in the attempt to spell out soft power 
resources, which then allow researchers and policy makers to consider the potential gains and 
draw-backs of strategies designed to win over opinion abroad and make states more attractive 
to others. Such an ideal type is useful as a starting point in understanding how and why states 
seek to influence others using sport diplomacy and SMEs. It is clear that not all states seek a 
soft power strategy as put forward in this article. Some, like Russia, for example, confound 
the standard rationale and do not fit the ideal type. Rather than rendering the ideal type 
problematic, such ‘outliers’ can be understood better, if researchers know in which way they 
differ from the mainstream.105 Debates on and around the empirical aspects of ‘soft power’ 
are to be encouraged and it is hoped that this article has been able to persuade scholars of the 
27 
 
value of studying sport diplomacy and SMEs in order to shed light on their role in a “politics 
of attraction”. 
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